The Disaster Response Stack: Local Resilience Equals National Security
The government response apparatus across Federal, state, and local emergency management operates like a software stack, where each layer provides services to the layer above while depending on the layer below. The federal government serves as the application layer, providing specialized resources and coordination. State governments function as the middleware, translating federal guidance into regional action while coordinating local efforts. Local governments operate as the foundational layer, providing direct services and first response capabilities.
Each layer has distinct responsibilities yet depends entirely on the layers beneath it for successful operation. When the local layer fails, it doesn't matter how sophisticated the federal response capabilities are; the entire system can become vulnerable to cascading failure.
Hurricane Katrina exemplified what happens when multiple layers of the emergency management stack fail simultaneously. The disaster revealed critical vulnerabilities at every level: local communications infrastructure collapsed, state coordination mechanisms were overwhelmed, and federal response protocols proved inadequate.
The response suffered from what experts refer to as "response gaps", breakdowns in coordination that occurred when local first responders became overwhelmed beyond their capacity. To continue the metaphor, this mirrors exactly what happens when lower layers of a software stack fail. The entire system becomes unstable regardless of how well the upper layers are designed. Katrina happened at a time when the United States was still in deep recovery from 9/11. Our systems were still being reconstituted at the Department of Homeland Security when Katrina made landfall as a Category 5 hurricane. All levels of government were woefully unprepared for what happened next, and at that moment, those of us working in the field of emergency management knew it would be bad, we just didn’t understand how bad.
Communication breakdowns proved particularly devastating. The Louisiana Emergency Operation Center had effectively coordinated with federal officials and local parishes before landfall, but after Katrina struck, communications became impossible for many local jurisdictions. This created a complete lack of situational awareness. Information continued to flow in through unofficial channels, but no unified command structure existed to process and act on it.
Katrina was an incredible lesson for all levels of government. Closer coordination, earlier declarations, routing of preparedness resources on a more predictable basis… the after-action reports that came out of Katrina became FEMA’s bible for many years after. Not since Hurricane Andrew, another Category 5 hurricane that absolutely obliterated Florida’s Miami-Dade county in 1992, had emergency response experienced such a policy change. In fact, Hurricane Andrew is the reason local, state, and federal entities have enjoyed such close coordination. Katrina was a once-in-a-lifetime storm and could have been way worse if the stack didn’t recover quickly and move past the initial trauma of response into one of the longest storm recovery periods in disaster history.
Years later, when Superstorm Sandy hit New York and parts of New England, the lessons from Katrina were front and center. Sandy’s coordinated response was one of the largest in history, and well-deserved. The storm was massive, killing over 140 people and resulting in over $70 billion in damages. FEMA's total spending related to Sandy exceeded $25.5 billion, still less than half of the overall assessment, as states and local communities picked up the tab where it made sense. You can measure state and local response in the burden of cost. FEMA has historically spent much of its disaster budget on response and recovery, but many of the programs it manages go toward everything “left of boom.” This is all the work we can do before a disaster hits, such as training, infrastructure resilience, resource planning, and community preparedness. More and more, states and locals will need to assume this work on their own, as FEMA has cut many of these programs in recent months as part of a cost-saving effort designed to make states more accountable during these incidents.
Still, no matter how small the Federal layer gets, the most critical insight from the software stack analogy is that system resilience depends on strong foundational layers. The truth is, the system will fail if local and state governments cannot maintain basic emergency functions independently. Recent policy developments recognize this reality. As we have discussed in this blog before, the 2025 executive order on "Achieving Efficiency Through State and Local Preparedness" explicitly states that "preparedness is most effectively owned and managed at the State, local, and even individual levels". This represents a fundamental shift toward strengthening the foundational layers of the emergency management stack.
State and local governments must shore up their own resources and capabilities rather than relying on federal assistance as a first resort. Communities need to develop robust local emergency management programs with adequate funding, trained personnel, and equipment[. Research shows that the most effective local emergency management programs are characterized by high collaborative capacity and strong partnerships with multiple stakeholders.
States will need to serve as more effective middleware between federal resources and local needs. This means developing sophisticated hazard mitigation plans, providing technical assistance to communities, and creating funding mechanisms for local resilience initiatives beyond what previous Federal program dollars required. Investments will need to continue to be made to ensure responders have the latest training and tools to get the job done, in many cases without Federal funding.
All levels must invest in current, up-to-date communication systems and shared data platforms that enable real-time coordination. This includes establishing common operating procedures and regular joint training exercises. These systems can be costly and unnecessarily complex. But they don’t have to be. Thankfully, services like FirstNet exist to bring current and next-gen broadband capabilities to responders at every level of government, while vendors like Emergent and RapidSOS are working to surface multiple data points in a single environment, streamlining emergency services data for users no matter which layer of the stack they serve.
The software stack analogy reveals a fundamental truth about emergency management: the system is only as strong as its weakest layer. When local capabilities fail, state resources become overwhelmed. When state coordination breaks down, federal response becomes ineffective. This creates cascading failures that can turn manageable disasters into catastrophic events.
The future path to true disaster resilience requires inverting the dependency model. Instead of local governments relying on federal assistance, the system must be designed with strong local foundations that can operate independently while seamlessly integrating with state and federal resources when needed.
State and local governments can no longer afford to wait for federal support to arrive. As we will see this hurricane season, the national response apparatus is being disrupted. State and local governments must build the capacity to be their own first, second, and third responders, creating resilient communities that can withstand disasters and recover quickly.